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Abstract
The attacks in Norway showed the horrifying strength of radical right thought in
contemporary Europe. Breivik s ideology as well as his actions are rooted in the radical
way of thinking that is embracing Europe today. Radicals are gaining more votes than ever,
and by challenging the globalised world, they are putting forward the idea of
"re-inventing" European national states in terms of anti-immigration, nationalism,
patriarchal values and ethnic purity.
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1. Introduction
The terrorist act on July 22, 2011 in Norway
stunned the world. The deadly march of Anders
Behring Breivik was a shock not only for Scan-
dinavian societies but also for the world at large.
The image of Norway as a peaceful, socially based
and progressive country was turned into a place
thriving with right-wing extremism. Breivik's
case is certainly a special one, but conceives with-
in it the imminent threat of radical right extrem-
ism. Roger Griffin's fascist minimum, the revolu-
tionary national reawakening, finds its place even
within radical right populists who are not consid-
ered as neo- fascists. Europe needs to re-define its
democratic minimum, because the existence and
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unprecedented actrvities of radical right parties
show the weakness of European judicial systems.
Namely, hate speech is omnipresent in public dis-
course and despite the charges, radical parties get
away with it unharmed.
Scandinavia is not immune to it. Quite the
contrary, electoral success of the radical right is
rising in every electoral cycle. Until recently, Fin-
land was the only country in Scandinavia (exclud-
ing far-away and very specific Iceland) without
the presence of a strong radical right party. Now
this has also changed. A Neo-Nazi and Neo-Pagan
underground is also very vivid and successful in
these countries. Maybe the Breivik case is unex-
pected, but his theories and his ideas are not un-
common in Scandinavian societies.
This article provides a short introduction
to Breivik's ideas connecting them to contem-
porary radical right thought in Western Europe.
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In addition, it brings the history of radical right
movements and parties in Scandinavia, and espe-
cially Norway.
2. Breivik's manifesto
Breivik makes an interesting insight in radical right
thought. His vast compendium "2083: A European
Declaration of Independence" shows remarkable
knowledge of different political worldviews and
boasts with classic radical right wing thinking on
world, religion, society and politics. It is written
in English, rather than in Norwegian, because
his message is essentially worldwide, or at least
Europe-wide. His viewpoint is inherently anti-
postmodern but conceives classic liberal modem
thought as the basic value of every Western Eu-
ropean society. Specifically, he opposes ideas and
movements labelled as postmodern, from feminist
ideas to the loss of significance of the nation-state.
The compendium is, in fact, a showcase for radi-
cal right movements and political parties in Scan-
dinavia (see below). His favourite literature, as he
wrote in his compendium (p. 1407), contains lib-
eral classics such as Thomas Hobbes, John Stuart
Mill, John Locke, Adam Smith, but also George
Orwell, Ayn Rand, William James and Carl von
Clausewitz. His manifesto is a vast and gener-
ally resourceful collection of thoughts, comments
and ideas about the Western European society in
general. He begins with the discussion about po-
litical correctness, labelling it as a cultural Marx-
ist term and the source of "all the mistakes and
wrongdoings of contemporary European govern-
ments", especially in introducing multiculturalist
policies. In this sense, he is very critical of Theo-
dore Adorno, George Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse
and Antonio Gramsci, as forerunners in Frankfurt
School. Nevertheless, his critique misses the very
foundation of this movement and at one point, he
misunderstands the very basics of the Frankfurt
School. Partial reading and misconclusions are
also present elsewhere in Breivik's manifesto.
Ardent Islamophobia and xenophobia are
present throughout Breivik's work. He is con-
stantly under the influence of Gisele Littman alias
Bat Ye'or, a British scholar of Jewish background,
who is arguing that Europe is under sway of will-
ing surrender to Islam. Europe is becoming "Eura-
bia", a thesis that is present in many other radical-
right groups, such as in Philip Dewinter's Vlaams
Belang in Belgium (previously known as Vlaams
Blok). Under this thinking, the great influx of
Muslims is part of the jihadist idea of conquer-
ing Europe, while European agenda here stems
from the French idea of the 1950s where a Euro-
Islamic axis should have made a counterbalance to
the USA and the Soviet Union. However, Islamo-
phobic personalities like Breivik and Bat Ye'or do
not recognise the possibility of coexistence; there
is only victory or total decay of Western civilisa-
tion. It is the time, as Breivik points, of "European
Slaves, Arab Masters". Breivik is also making
his own image as a fierce Zionist. Israelis are, ac-
cording to his viewpoint, "brothers in arms", the
blocking tower against Islamic invasion. It is the
myth gone wild.
Renowned twentieth-century philosopher
Ernst Cassirer explains that in man's practical and
social life there is a defeat of rational thought, much
different from scientific researches, which forms a
basis of our every-day life influenced by modem
technology and scientific breakthroughs. He per-
ceives myth not only as a product of intellectual
processes; it sprouts from deep human emotions
(Cassirer, 43). However, Cassirer stresses that myth
cannot be described as a bare emotion because it
is the expression of emotion: "The expression of a
feeling is not the feeling itself-it is emotion turned
into an image" (ibid). Indeed, this image, in the cre-
ation of myth of the state, or identity, is intertwined
with culture, music, poetry, arts. Cassirer says, "To
the true romanticist there could be no sharp differ-
ence between myth and reality; just as little as there
was any separation between poetry and truth. Po-
etry and truth, myth and reality interpenetrate each
other and coincide with each other" (ibid, 5). The
more poetic it is, the truer it becomes. Myth is filled
with the most violent emotions and the most fright-
ful visions, says Cassirer. Nevertheless, in myth
man begins to learn a new and strange art: the art of
expressing, and that means of organizing, his most
rooted instincts, his hopes and fears. The fears ex-
plained here, however, are becoming an enchanted
circle of hatred and disapproving identities. This
characteristic of human beings is certainly used
by radical right groups, spreading fear in order to
spread their own ideology.
Breivik finds the answer to all these threats
in coming back to traditional nationalism. The na-
tion is a big solidarity, says Ernst Renan, and it is
based on sacrifices, which are understood as nec-
essary in past, present and in future (Renan, 1995:
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56). Political myth transcends logic, it is elusive,
but because of this elusiveness, it has a coherent
and complete belief system. There is neither le-
gitimacy nor logic other than its own. Vladimir
Tismaneanu mentions major themes revolving
around such political mythologies: Golden Age
(innocence lost, glorious patriarchal beginnings,
the fall into modernity); victimhood, martyrdom,
treason and conspiracy; salvation and the advent
of the millennium; charismatic saviours (who can
be heroic individuals, allegedly predestined class-
es, or biologically defined races); and ultimate
bliss in the form of revolutionary chiliasm, when
leader, movement, nation, and mankind become
one, whether in life or death (Tismaneanu, 9). Its
principal function is to imagine a reality in accord-
ance with certain political interests.
His manifesto attacks the governments
of Europe, especially those of social-democratic
background. Breivik perceives them as being the
same as "all the other socialists", naming explic-
itly Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Marx and, interestingly,
Hitler. In his view, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi move-
ment were, in its very core, socialist. In this way,
Breivik cannot be called a Nazi, as National So-
cialism is to him a mere variation of the ideology
he strives against. His opposition to neo-Nazism
is certain if we consider him as "Zionist-friendly".
Breivik is also overtly anti-feminist. Fol-
lowing the critique of cultural Marxism, he stress-
es that there is an active feminisation of European
culture, with the goal of transforming patriarchal
society into a matriarchal form. In this way, new
cultural trends want to "deny the intrinsic worth
of native Christian European heterosexual males".
This is wrong, according to him, out of two basic
principles. Firstly, it destroys the traditional nucle-
ar family and bears responsibility for demographic
demise, while the threat of Muslim colonisation is
at the gates. Secondly, because women are having
a (basically false) liberal consciousness, the socie-
ty must be brought back to the state of mind of the
1950s, when Norway has been pure and conserva-
tive, and where women have been considered to
be reproductive machines and have been able to
receive a maximum education of bachelor degree.
Women are also taken as a metaphor: Since Eu-
rope is like a woman, it submits itself to rape.
This statement, however, is not so un-
common for the radical right. According to Terri
Givens, who made research on the radical right
gender gap, women are less likely to vote for the
radical right because there are fewer women who
are employed and work in the sectors (manufac-
turinglblue-collar) that are attracted to the radical
right (Givens, 2004: 39). Although she finds that
Scandinavian societies have comparatively less
differences between men and women, neverthe-
less, when immigration is used as a dependent
variable, this difference persists (ibid, 50). Also,
Givens finds that men are more likely to vote for
the radical right than women because they have
stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than women
(ibid, 41), and that the occupations most affected
by globalisation and immigration (i.e. blue-collar
industrial workers) will be more anti-immigrant
than those in other sectors (ibid, 42). Thus, we
can conclude, that radical right parties are essen-
tially traditional patriarchal "men" parties. But, in
the same Scandinavian environment, there is one
successful radical right party, the Danish People's
Party, led by a woman, Pia Kjrersgaard.
Breivik disclosed the manifest to his like-
minded fellows and friends a few hours before
the attacks. Later on, he went to the governmental
quarter of Oslo and activated a car bomb outside
the office of Norwegian Prime Minister and other
governmental buildings. It killed eight people and
wounded several others. Two hours later, in full
police uniform, Breivik arrived to the summer
camp on the island of Uteya in Tyrifjorden, organ-
ized by the youth division of the ruling Labour
Party. He opened fire, killing 69 persons, among
them personal friends of the Prime Minister as
well as the stepbrother of Norway's crown-prin-
cess Mette-Marit. He was soon captured by police,
arrested and put on trial. Among many shocking
testimonies, he said that the attacks were "grue-
some, but necessary". Leading members of the
European radical right immediately accused the
attacks and spread their conviction that Breivik
has done it not out of ideology, but because he is
insane. The same reason was put forward by Brei-
vik's defence at court. Especially it was the case
with Geert Wilders, the chairman of the Dutch
Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and
with the English Defence League. Both reacted
instantly. Mr. Wilders was explicit: "Neither the
PVV nor I are responsible for a lone idiot who vi-
olently distorted the freedom-loving, anti-Islami-
zation ideals, no matter how much some people
would like that." The English Defence League
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in its official statement denied any connection
to Breivik and accused the media for creating a
false image in the public. In the meantime, psy-
chiatrists assessing the self-confessed Norwegian
mass killer concluded that he was suffering from
paranoid schizophrenia. In the end, Breivik will
still be tried in April 2012, but it seems likely that
he will be placed in psychiatric care rather than
prison. Prosecutors told to the public that the two
psychiatrists who interviewed him on 13 occa-
sions had concluded that he lived in his "own de-
lusional universe where all his thoughts and acts
are guided by his delusions". Prosecutor Inga Be-
jer Engh speaking to reporters on November 29,
2011 in Oslo, said: "If the final conclusion is that
Breivik is insane, we will request that the court in
the upcoming legal proceedings passes a sentence
by which Breivik is subjected to compulsory men-
tal health care". Although this brings another spe-
cific aspect of the Breivik case, it does not mean
that radical right background is prone only to psy-
chiatric cases.
3. Radical right scene in Norway
The radical right is a strongly heterogenic party
family, with national specifics, election success-
es and with very different reasons for their sur-
vival in the political arena. Cas Mudde mentions
58 different definitions of the radical right, and
their most common characteristics, as parties and
movements that embrace nationalism, racism,
xenophobia, anti-democratic values and statism.
Consequently, Mudde counts 23 terms describ-
ing these movements: extreme right (Schain et al.
2002a; Perrineau 2001; Hainsworth 2000a; Ignazi
1994; Pfahl-Traughber 1993; Stouthuysen 1993),
far right (Jungerstam-Mulders 2003; Roxburgh
2002; Marcus 2000; Cheles et al. 1995), radical
right (Ramet 1999a; Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt
& McGann 1995; Merkl & Weinberg 1993), right
(Betz & Immerfall 1998; Hockenos 1993), radi-
cal right populism (Zaslove 2004a; Betz 1994),
right populism (Eismann 2002; Decker 2000;
Pfahl-Traughber 1994), national populism (Back-
es 1991; Taguieff 1984), new populism (Lloyd
2003; Taggart 1995), neopopulism (Betz & Im-
merfaIl1998), exclusionist populism (Betz 2001),
xenophobic populism (DeAngelis, 2003), populist
nationalism (Blokker, 2005), ethnic nationalism
(Rydgren, 2004a), anti-immigrant parties (Gibson,
2002; Fennema, 1997), nativism (Fetzer, 2000),
racism (MacMaster, 2001; Husbands, 1988; El-
bers & Fennema, 1993), racist extremism (Mudde,
2005), fascism (Ford, 1992; Laqueur, 1996), neo-
fascism (Fenner & Weitz, 2004; Karapin, 1998;
Cheles et aI, 1991), postfascism (Mell, 2002), re-
actionist tribalism (Antonio, 2000), integralism
(Holmes, 2000) and anti-partisanship (Belanger,
2004)*. Of course, the attempts to give the parties
a special name are associated with the definition
of radical right parties by individual researchers.
However, although all authors agree that the ap-
proach to these parties should still be individual,
on case-by-case basis; there is general agreement
on the authoritarian nature of the radical right. It
includes dogmatism, rigidity, exclusivity, authori-
tarianism, nationalism, xenophobia, racism, intol-
erance and so on.
The term is so problematic because of
the very concept of the right itself. In this case,
it is not at all hostile to the leftist ideas. Accord-
ing to the theory of relative deprivation, resource
struggle between citizens and immigrants in a glo-
balised world threatens workers, the unemployed,
those employed in regressive industries, workers
with economic uncertainty and identity problems
in the new economic environment. These voters
are more likely to vote for radical right populist
parties than for traditional social democratic ones
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Eatwell, 2004).
What is indeed right and what is left in radical
right is thus a matter of perspective. Opposing all
change is not the distinctive character of this right
any more. Conceptually, these parties are called
radical rightist parties, as they combine all the
"rightist" positions. But, they also have a popu-
list character and strong social messages stressing
(national) unity. In political science, one tries to
systemise the terms, and it certainly makes some
kind of confusion. The left oriented worker, as
mentioned before, will hardly, according to the ra-
tional choice theory, vote for a radical right party.
But this party also has a social program, full of
justice, order and peace, issues that the worker is
interested in. If voters vote for the party according
to their own left-right continuum position, they
will have little or no interest in the party that is
far from their standpoint, and big interest in the
party close to it. However, if a radical right party is
not perceived in the same way as other parties, but
according to some other criteria, then the voter's
perception changes as well. Van der Brug et al.
* Everything in: Mudde, 2007: 11, 12
JULY/DECEMBER 2011 9
(2005) have concluded that, if the voter perceives
some party as an essentially protest one, the poten-
tial protest voter would be interested in giving his
voice even to the party that is far from his personal
standpoint and his self-perception as a participa-
tive citizen. Thus, radical right parties are often
considered as protest or anti-system parties, which
are apriori not institutionalised parties. This is of-
ten proved by economically determined election
results. If prices are up, inflation, crisis and unem-
ployment are soaring then radical right parties are
expected to have bigger success. But, a strong link
between the crisis and their success is not proven.
Of course, we should not understand the
left-right continuum in a two-dimensional, but
rather in a multi-dimensional system, with addi-
tional variables and sub-variables, bordering with
relative complexity of connecting, integrating and
practical concluding. Also, if there can be un-
institutionalised parties in institutionalised party
systems (Italy would be a good example), why is
it so difficult to perceive the institutionalisation
of anti-system parties, which ironically, function
very well in institutionalised party systems (a
good example is the Communist party of Bohe-
mia and Moravia, the anti-system party function-
ing within the multi-party liberal democracy in the
Czech Parliament today)?
More and more pragmatic conservatism is
evident in Western European radical right parties.
There has been a wide debate among academics
whether such parties in general can be called radi-
cal, extremist or populist. The author here sug-
gests that it is the wrong question, because the
parties themselves are very loosely connected by
their ideologies, and due to national specificities
they can be labelled only as subcategories such as
"anti-immigrant parties", or "radical right popu-
list parties". At the same time, these categories are
more of descriptive nature than the specific party
group. Some of them are racist, and some are only
immigrant exclusive. It would be very difficult to
gather all these parties in one distinctive group
with a common character. Scandinavian Progress
parties, for example, have no historical connection
with the fascist tradition. These parties are adjust-
ing to the system, hence possibly losing part of
their identity or the distinctive feature in their op-
position to the mainstream, as well as intra-party
relations regarding the idea, but abide by liberal
democratic values of parliamentary representative
democracy, gaining votes, and essentially "play-
ing by the book".
Scandinavia has always been seen as a
special case in comparison to some other radical
right landscapes in Europe. So called progress
parties were founded in the seventies and have
continued to exist to this day. The contemporary
scene of radical right in Scandinavia is vivid and
gaining strength. From basically populist conserv-
ative-liberal movements, these parties have be-
come the beacons of new anti-immigrant thought.
Today, in Scandinavia there are five parties worth
mentioning that bear the name of the radical right.
Firstly, there is the tremendously successful Dan-
ish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), a party
that was in government from 2001 to 2011; it was
a breakout branch of the Progress Party (Frem-
skridtspartiet), which still exists today, but have
a lesser impact on Danish society. In Finland, for
the first time, a radical right True Finns Party (Pe-
russuomalaiset) entered the Parliament in 2011,
winning 19.1 percent of votes. Sweden is captured
by New Democracy (Ny Demokrati), which en-
tered the Parliament in 2010, after many years out-
side the legislative chambers. In Norway, the most
important party is the Norwegian Progress Party
(Fremskrittspartiet, FrP). Breivik was a member
ofthis party, but two years ago he left it, because it
was not radical enough. At first Scandinavian par-
ties were formed as anti-tax parties, as a reaction
against the ever-increasing welfare state. Indeed,
after tax lawyer Mogens Glistrup founded the
Progress Party in Denmark, and made consider-
able success, Norwegians tried to follow. The first
name of the FrP was Anders Lange's Party for a
Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public In-
tervention, simply following the founder and the
brief description of party activity (Bjorklund, 1). It
was the period of economic revival in the European
North. Only in 1963 did Norway assert its sover-
eign right over oil fields in the North Sea, and be-
gan its way to become one of the most prosperous
countries in Europe. After the 1990s, due to strong
transformation of political parties (Beyme, 2002),
voters lost their traditional partisan allegiances,
especially those connected to class and religion.
New patterns of voting emerged, and some par-
ties, like the FrP gained strength by applying more
populist, more radical policies against immigra-
tion and by requesting law and order.
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However, as is apparent elsewhere, these
parties cannot be in power alone and are mostly
focused on coalition building or supporting the
government of the day in the Parliament. Thus,
they also have to change some of their ideology
or discourse. In 2001, the FrP supported a minor-
ity government in Norway, but it also toned down
its anti-immigrant rhetoric. And while earlier this
party had been considered a pariah party by other
actors in the political arena, later on the FrP gained
an unprecedented position oflegitimacy and influ-
ence (Widfeldt, 2004: 151).
The theoretician of fascism Roger Grif-
fin, however, suggests that fascism is still in the
core of every anti-immigrant party, no matter how
liberal its actual social policies might be. In this
way, Griffin labels Italian MSI and Flemish Bloc
as neo-fascist; German REP, DVU and NPD as
crypto-fascist; and FPO, the Centre Party in the
Netherlands and the Progress parties in Scandina-
via as the ones who have adopted growing crypto-
fascist racist policies (Griffin, 1991: 161-179). Of
course, one has to notice the difference in style,
policies, origins, leadership, etc.
In fact, Andersen and Bjorklund explain
that, in the context of predominantly social demo-
cratic Scandinavia, it is not too surprising to find
parties less extreme than their counterparts else-
where (Hainsworth, 2008: 48). Others often char-
acterise Progress parties as entrepreneurial parties,
i.e. those which saw opportunities in the political
party system of the mid-to-late 1980s and aggres-
sively sought strategies to position themselves to
take advantage of the openings. They reinvented
themselves and adopted winning formulas based
on populism and economic arguments (not racial
ones) against the presence of immigrants. Hains-
worth agrees that Progress parties in Norway and
Denmark are essentially anti-establishment and
anti-elitist, seeking to break the mould of the tra-
ditional party politics and policy making (in this
case, it is social democracy).
The Norwegian Progress Party is basically
a successor of Anders Lange's Party and it revived
the political scene in the Norwegian Parliament,
Storting, by gaining 4.5 percent and four seats in
the 1981 elections, and again 3.7 percent and two
seats in 1985. After these modest results, the party
managed to take 12.3 percent and 22 seats in 1989,
backing temporarily to 6.3 percent, and ten seats
in 1993. Impressive 15.3 percent and 22 seats in
1997 were followed by 14.6 percent in 2001. The
last result is impressive nonetheless because the
party split in 1994, when members of the neo-lib-
eral wing left. (Hainsworth, 2008: 50). In fact, the
FrP not only established a stronger policy against
immigration, but it increased membership in a
time when all the other (mainstream) parties strug-
gled to keep their membership stable and intact.
In 2001 the new government, involving the Con-
servatives (Heyre), the Christian People's Party
(KrF) and the Liberals (Venstre), was supported
by the Progress Party. In 2005, the Norwegian
Prime Minister refused to have formal coopera-
tion with the FrP and thus lost their support. The
former coalition lost, the Left enjoyed victory, but
the FrP received 22 percent and 38 seats, emerg-
ing as the leading party on the right and Norway's
second largest party behind the Labour Party. Af-
ter the old chief Carl Hagen has left in 2006, the
party started to grow under the new leadership of
Siv Jensen and even looked to form a government
on its own (Hainsworth, ibid: 51). Overall, the far
right's ascent reached an undoubted post-war peak
in the region with the parliamentary elections in
2005. There have been some signs of extreme right
and populist success, but hardly on the same scale
or consistency as in Norway (and in Denmark),
where anti-immigrant discourses have served to
attract voters (ibid: 53).
Andersen and Bjorklund (2000: 216)
found that in Norway the voters for the extreme
right were more on the younger side, mostly
young men, even the core supporters of the par-
ty. The grievance model of Elisabeth Ivarsflaten
(2007) shows remarkably what the main prefer-
ences of Scandinavian radical right voters are.
In her analysis, she shows how easily deceptive
some economically determined theories might be.
The models that place primary importance on eco-
nomic changes propose that successful populist
right parties attract voters who prefer right-wing
economic policies (ibid, 6), but in Ivarsflaten's
cross-country analysis of Western Europe, one can
easily see that the extent to which successful party
mobilises economic grievances does not make bet-
ter impact than all major parties. Indeed, the ma-
jor parties of the right mobilised voters who prefer
right-wing economic policies more successfully
than the populist right parties in Denmark and
Norway (ibid, 11). Thus, the radical right could be
successful without mobilising voters with right-
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wing economic preferences. However, Norway
possesses another interesting feature. Ivarsflaten's
results show that the Norwegian radical right suc-
cessfully mobilises distrust in the EU and politi-
cal elites better than all major parties, although the
Christian Democratic Party has a better stand-off
with the disillusionment with the European Parlia-
ment, probably because Norway is not part of the
EU and Norwegians rejected to enter the European
Union twice. Empirically, Ivarsflaten showed that
one grievance, immigration, is consistently mo-
bilised by all successful populist right parties in
Western Europe. Economic changes and elitist or
corrupt politics, on the other hand, contributed to
the explanation of the populist right vote in some,
but not all countries.
Breivik's challenge poses also the dif-
ficult question of whether he acted alone or was
he a proponent of some other party or extra-party
groups. His own opinion is that the parties listed
here are on good track, but not necessarily radical
enough.
In general, radical right parties are of-
ten connected to groups and subcultures through
their members. Party organisation is vital here. It
consists of a number of party members, national
coverage, regular annual meetings and human and
material resources. Today, party membership is not
big. Political scientists try to find out whether the
reason is the loss of interest of the citizens to be-
come members of a party or it is the opinion of
the party leadership that it is not necessary to in-
vest in membership. Sigmund Neumann thought
that democratic parties with huge membership are
necessary for the survival of modem democracy,
because only the parties are capable of guarding
the connection between the individual and the
broader community (Neumann, 1956). Maurice
Duverger also thinks that democratic parties with
big membership are the dominant force in politics.
Both Neumannn and Duverger wrote under the in-
fluence of the Second World War. Other research-
ers thought it was unnecessary to give such a big
importance to membership. Otto Kirchheimer sug-
gests that catch-all parties have an electoral strat-
egy without the need for big party organisation
(Kirchheimer, 1996). From the demand side, party
leadership loses its interest in the organised sup-
port because it is a comparatively useless electoral
resource (Scarrow, 1996: 6). New information-
communication technologies, especially in the me-
dia sector, make possible for the parties to employ
easily a small and efficient number of profession-
als instead of huge numbers of party volunteers.
Parties do not depend on financial strength of their
members either; the price is rather high anyway,
so that the primary source of financing must come
from outside. The supply side also shows the dif-
ference between the former class and interest par-
ties and contemporary mass and catch-all parties.
Big and organised parties bring another potentially
lethal combination. In 1911, Robert Michels wrote
about the Iron law of Oligarchy, i.e. that every
organisation is an oligarchy, and if that organisa-
tion is big, the oligarchy is even bigger. Mosei
Ostrogorski in his classic work Democracy and
Organisation of Political Parties also claims that
parties with good extra-parliamentary organisation
are not desirable, because they cannot rule in the
nation's name. The party leaders rule the state.
In the theory of party institutionalisation,
the party must be autonomous, i.e. independent
of their leaders, and party activities must not be
under heavy influence of organisations, groups
and ideologies existing outside the party. Radical
right parties have often been described as highly
charismatic ones, with a great deal of personali-
sation (Eatwell, 2003; Taggart, 2000), but there
are researchers who challenge this theory. They
do not think that there is sufficient evidence for
the charismatic person to be present everywhere
and be powerful, but acknowledge his importance
in an authoritarian intra-party climate. However,
they warn, charismatic leadership is not achieved
and perceived in any better way in the radical right
parties than in other mainstream parties.
4. Conclusion
Breivik's act is certainly horrific and must be con-
demned by all means. Despite his psychotic be-
haviour, caused by his illness, his idea does not
stem from his illness, but from an ideology per-
sisting in post-industrial societies in Europe. This
persistence, incorporated in parties and subcul-
tures like skinheads, Neo-Nazis and Neo-Pagan
(Aryan, racist, Nordic) groups that are thriving in
Northern Europe, might give us a clue that maybe
they are not part of the system, but are rooted in
Nordic societies. The touch of globalisation came
to Norway too, despite the social welfare. Today,
one can see rising crime rates, the crisis of na-
tional identity as well as of faith and even of the
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monarchy itself, and the loss of traditional Nordic
values. Norway, as well as other Western Europe-
an countries, indeed expresses the need to "re-in-
vent" themselves. Breivik, unfortunately, did it in
a wrong way. Still, we may have the opportunity
to see more radical groups and parties filling the
political space of Europe.
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